George Giacaman

 

This paper was presented at a conference on PNA-NGO Relations held by the Welfare Association, Ramallah, Feb. 14-16, 2000.

 

 

My task in this session is not an easy one.  I was asked to offer an historical perspective on the development of civil society in Palestine; an analysis of factors influencing it at present; case-studies of positive contributions; and prospects for the 21st century.  All in 15 minutes.

 

I note this by way of apology should my remarks appear brief. I will focus on some of the more salient aspects of these topics viewed from the perspective of issues of current relevance.

 

If by 'civil society' one means societal organization of varied types existing in relative independence from the state, then such organization has had a long history in Palestine. Under Ottoman rule, for example, considerable local autonomy was possible at different periods, and pre-modern forms of association that were ethnic, tribal, or kinship-based organized the lives of different communities with custom and tribal law as central elements contributing to their cohesion. Several of the functions of such forms of organization now belong, or should belong, to the state (for instance, unity and rule of law) and to non-governmental organizations among other groups including political parties, which can be potential agents of social change at least in the political sphere. 

 

Modern forms of association based on voluntary membership increased in the twentieth century. The Zionist-Palestinian conflict was a contributing factor. In the inter-war period new political parties emerged whose main focus for work was the continuing and increasing Zionist colonization of Palestine. These parties however were largely led by well-known land-owning or urban families.  As a result, political life and rivalry acquired a traditional family and clannish coloring. Nevertheless, this period witnessed an increase in other forms of association such as unions, charitable societies, clubs, professional associations and the like.

 

This trend continued through the 1950s and 1960s, spurred especially by the dispossession of 1948. Many organizations, groups, and charitable societies were formed to minister to the needs of the Palestinian people especially those that became refugees.  These organizations continue to the present day.

 

The emergence of the PLO brought a qualitative change to specific aspects of Palestinian political life and organization. It brought political diversity and a clearer definition of ideological pluralism within Palestinian society, and introduced modern party association with a concentrated focus on Palestinian national issues. The PLO was not led by traditional landed families. Membership within the groups and parties within the PLO was open, and for ill or for good, upward mobility within parties was possible based on the rules of the game of party politics.  This was not always a democratic process but success did not require a pedigree. Thus it was possible for many from rural backgrounds or from refugee camps or from the ranks of the poor to rise to positions of prominence in the PLO and within Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza.  Many were later to become the "new elite" within the system established by the Palestinian Authority after Oslo.

 

Within this broad historical and political context, the development of civil society in Palestine was influenced by two main developments: the onset of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, and the establishment of the first Palestinian national authority in Palestine in 1994.

 

In response to the first, one important priority, in addition to resistance to occupation, was self-preservation as a people. Palestinians clearly understood that one of the most important strategic assets they have is their presence on their own land, and that the "Palestinian Problem" would not have existed as far as Israel was concerned were it not for this fact.

 

Ten years through occupation this translated itself into an ideology of sumud, of "steadfastness", endurance, continued presence on land.  And sumud was not conceived in passive terms as the phrases I have used might suggest. On the contrary, it required organization, service delivery, networking, mobilization, and the creation of "support systems" of various types ranging from day-care centers to income-generating projects.

 

It is within this broad context that we saw the establishment of a new generation of organizations seeking to fulfill some of the needs of Palestinians under occupation. The work of charitable organizations continued through this period, but the new non-governmental organizations appeared different in more than one respect including the fact that they were often specialized, in areas such as education, health, agriculture, development, and human rights.

 

I refer to human rights in particular because it may be possible to say that Palestinians "discovered" human rights in a concrete way under occupation, in the concrete and tangible manner in which concepts and mechanisms relate to their situation. Limitations were also widely understood: there were no illusions about the justice of military courts, or due process under the military. Everyone also understood that lawyers were for the most part intermediaries seeking the best bargain possible for their clients, and that their work as lawyers was severely circumscribed.  Still, the Palestinians' case was often made in the name of those rights, as universal rights that also apply to Palestinians. We addressed the world from within the framework of human rights discourse as a common language that connects Palestinians to the world outside.

 

It is therefore not less than puzzling to witness the hesitation of some on the question of the relevance of human rights issues internally, after the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority.  Such hesitation betrays a cynically instrumental view of human rights, that undermines the credibility of the Palestinian position especially given the outstanding issues with Israel relating to rights, both individual and collective.

 

The second important factor to influence the development of civil society in Palestine was the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. A host of new issues were now facing Palestinians revolving around the nature of the relation between government and society, and the type of political system that will be established. One central question revolved around whether the PLO will succeed in making the transition from a national liberation movement in exile to a government accountable to the people on issues that had not been faced before.

 

One main concern was whether the highly centralized decision-making process in the PLO on the eve of the Oslo accords would translate into authoritarian tendencies in government. Another equally important concern was whether the "PLO model" would be transposed to govern a population on its own land, given that the model does not distinguish between government and civil society. This is because the PLO was not only composed of political formations, but also contained within its structures labor unions, student unions, teacher's unions, women's unions, writers' unions, productive enterprises, research centers, and NGO's.

 

The requirements of the national struggle and of survival in the diaspora appeared to mandate such a mobilizational effort. An all-encompassing organization also seemed essential for the expression and preservation of a collective identity, for a definition and preservation of the self in juxtaposition to a community uprooted and to a society destroyed.

 

The PLO 'model' therefore harboured within it two contradictory elements: a pluralistic civil-society-in-the-making lodged within the confines of a proto-state, the PLO. For by definition the sphere of civil society is the non-state sphere, or that which exists in relative independence from the state.  Yet in the absence of a state and in the conditions of the diaspora, the antinomy of state/civil society endured as a temporary necessity and as a means of shouldering national responsibilities, in what was hoped would be a transitional stage.

 

But once a new Palestinian political formation emerged on the ground in Palestine after Oslo, the threat to civil society from such a unitary model and history became quickly apparent, especially in light of the disarray of the opposition within the PLO and the resultant weakness of political parties.

 

For the essence of the model stems from the mobilizational aims of the PLO towards a community in dispersion. But once the model is transposed to govern a population living on its own land, its latent authoritarian traits quickly come to the fore.

 

Thus the all-encompassing totality of the model envisions society "organized' into "General" and "Higher" unions, associations, organizations, societies, and Councils, at the top of which, after Oslo, the Palestinian National Authority presides.  The Irony of having the government establish "Higher" and "General" councils for unions, writers, and NGO's in the spirit of the unitary model appears to have escaped its founders.

 

Such issues leave several questions that need to be addressed.  Indeed, some are being addressed now, but agreement on them has yet to be reached, and most importantly, institutionalized.  Among these, perhaps the most important question has to do with the role of government, or the state, in society, and clarity on what is governmental and what is non-governmental. Clarity is needed in more than one sphere among which I mention two: in the sphere of economic activity; for instance, whether the government is a partner in economic activity, or a facilitator and coordinator, and in the sphere of work of the "third sector", the work of non-governmental organizations. However, it should be noted here that during the past three years, for example, varied cooperative projects and activities have taken place between NGO's and several ministries. Still, more clarity is needed on the respective roles of government and in this case, NGO's, especially since these issues remain outstanding.

 

Several factors will affect the development of civil society in Palestine the most important of which is the stability and sustainability of the sphere of civil society itself. This in turn depends on the nature of the political system, and on the existence of structural guarantees such as a functioning court system; unification of the various branches of the executive, including the many police and security apparatuses; and a rational functioning bureaucracy with clear job descriptions and lines of authority and decision-making. In addition, devolvement of real authority from central government to ministries and local councils, to a degree commensurate with their tasks, is also necessary.

 

But above all, a functioning legal system and the supremacy of the rule of law and the protection of civil liberties are the most important factors influencing the future development of civil society in Palestine.  Various reports and many recommendations have been made on some of these questions, but not much has been done in terms of change.

 

Looking at the future, it is clear that the present system being set up in Palestine is inherently unstable.  Fully one-third of the labour force is employed by government, and job-creation as a result of investment remains minimal. The present environment in Palestine is not conducive to investment. This is partly due to the political situation, but it is also due to the weakness of the necessary infrastructure, especially the administrative and the legal.  The rules of the game are not clear, and most ministries will virtually have to be overhauled from top to bottom if they were to serve developmental aims.

 

The role of the state in developing countries remains indispensable. In spite of quick views formed a few years ago about the diminishing role of states in the present global order, such views have been under revision during the past two or three years. In poor countries, empowerment of women is not possible without compulsory education on a mass level. It is clear that this is not a job for the market, or a mission for NGO's.  In several other sectors, similar questions will have to be asked about the roles of different actors.

 

A constructive and calm discussion of such questions is needed in Palestine, and there is considerable room for a serious initiative. When it begins, we would begin the process of developing a view of the role of civil society in Palestine for the new century.